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Discrimination in the Lab:
Experiments Exploring the Impact of Performance and
Appearance on Sorting and Cooperation
Marco Castillo Ragan Petrie∗
Georgia Institute of Technology Georgia State University
July 2006
Abstract: We present experimental evidence consistent with statistical discrim-
ination in a public good and group formation game. We find that behavior is
correlated with race and gender, and people use race and gender to predict be-
havior when no other information is available. When information on behavior
is provided, people disregard personal characteristics completely. These charac-
teristics are also disregarded when individual behavior is induced to break the
correlation between characteristics and behavior. That is, people disregard race
and gender even when observed behavior is unusual but relevant to payoffs. Fi-
nally, our experiments show that sorting into groups has dramatic implications on
cooperation. Overall payoffs are higher when sorting is possible than when groups
are randomly assigned. This only occurs, however, when personal characteristics
are known. Higher payoffs are attained at the cost of an equitable distribution.
∗Petrie thanks the Office of the Advancement of Women and the Office of the Vice
President for Research at Georgia State University for financial support. We also thank
Krawee Ackaramongkolrotn, Todd Swarthout, and seminar participants at the South-
ern Economics Association meetings, the International Economics Science Association
meetings, Georgia State University, and Georgetown University.
1. Introduction
Without information on the reputation or performance of others, people may turn
to physical appearance as the criteria for forming impressions or choosing associ-
ations. For example, people may withdraw from or never enter into interactions
with certain segments of the population because of these impressions. Initial per-
ceptions might persist even in the face of evidence contradicting them. In the long
run, individuals in society may suffer persistent losses due to exclusion if enough
sorting takes place.
How important are these types of (mis)perceptions in determining group com-
position and economic outcomes? This research uses laboratory experiments to
examine how and why observable characteristics and salient performance signals
are used by people to sort into groups. We conjecture that people may focus on
personal characteristics, such as gender or race, to choose group members because
they lack better information on future performance. The difficulty of identifying
whether personal characteristics have an impact on who is chosen as a group mem-
ber is that personal characteristics and performance can be correlated (or thought
to be). For example, if men are better performers and we observe a preference
for men as group members, is this because they are better performers or because
people prefer to be in groups with men? Our experiments test this hypothesis by
manipulating the information made available to subjects and by inducing behav-
ior to break the correlation between performance and personal characteristics. We
do this by making personal characteristics irrelevant or bad predictors of behavior
and therefore irrelevant to payoffs.
We use a repeated linear public goods game. Repeated public goods exper-
iments are a natural environment in which to study group formation because
payments in the experiment are a function of both individual and group behavior.
The more cooperative are the other group members, the more money a person
makes. In our experimental treatments, subjects are shown either the digital
photographs of others in the experiment or information on past performance (or
both). Subjects are asked to choose who they would like to have in their group.
One treatment breaks the correlation between performance and appearance, and
this allows us to identify discrimination for other than statistical reasons.
Our approach is novel in that it manipulates information or the equilibrium at
the experimental level within the same game to identify sources of discrimination.
Not only can we distinguish if discrimination is statistical or taste-based, but by
altering the incentives to create the necessary counterfactuals, we can directly
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observe the impact of sorting on performance and payoffs. Our environment is
strategic and relevant to understanding how groups or neighborhoods form.
Several experimental studies have shown the social context of decisions can af-
fect outcomes (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; and Burnham,
2003). Indeed, specific characteristics of a partner, such as gender, beauty and
ethnicity, can affect decisions (Andreoni and Petrie, 2005; Castillo and Carter,
2006; Eckel and Wilson, 2003; Ferraro and Cummings, 2006; Hammermesh and
Biddle, 1994; Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006; and Petrie, 2004). There is also ex-
perimental evidence showing that strategic behavior is affected by gender (Croson
and Gneezy, 2004). Finally, Slonim (2004) shows that there is significant against
one’s gender discrimination in a trust game where partners are chosen.
There have been several studies to discern the nature of discrimination, i.e.,
whether it is taste-based (Becker, 1975) or statistical (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972).
The literature on sport economics, where performance is measured more accu-
rately and therefore regressions of wages on race are less susceptible to omitted
variable problems, is mixed. For instance, there is evidence of wage discrimination
in basketball but not in baseball (Kahn, 1991). Audit studies suggest findings con-
sistent with taste-based discrimination (Riach and Rich, 2002), but there are con-
cerns about treatment effect biases (Heckman, 1998). Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004) improve upon audit studies by creating fake resumes and find that those
with black-sounding names tend to be discriminated against. While their study
finds evidence of discrimination, it cannot identify its nature since resumes are
imperfect measures of performance.
Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) develop a test of taste-based discrimina-
tion in police car searches. They observe that the success rate of police searches
must be equalized across drivers’ races in a matching-pennies model of police in-
terdiction. They find evidence of statistical discrimination but not taste-based
discrimination. A more robust test of taste-based discrimination was suggested
by Anwar and Fang (2006). They also find evidence of statistical but not taste-
based discrimination. However, as the authors acknowledge, their test favors the
hypothesis of no taste-based discrimination. Finally, Levitt (2004) exploits the
changes in incentives in the Weakest Link television show to test for alternative
theories of discrimination. He does not find evidence of race or gender discrimi-
nation but of age discrimination.
An alternative way to test for taste-based discrimination is the use of economic
experiments. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) show evidence of statistical discrimi-
nation in Israel. They observed that people mistrusted men of Eastern origin but
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otherwise did not make a difference when given the opportunity to make transfers
to them. List (2004) also provides evidence of statistical discrimination in a sport
cards market by collecting additional evidence with experiments. He finds that
difference in bargaining behavior can be explained by difference in the distribution
of reservation valuation and willingness to pay. Similar to Fershtman and Gneezy,
he uses allocation exercises to test for taste-based discrimination and finds no
evidence of it.
Our approach is similar to Fershtman and Gneezy and List in that we uti-
lize economic experiments to gather information otherwise not readily available
in economic transactions. To directly test for alternative theories of discrimina-
tion, our approach is different in that we use the same game and manipulate the
information available to subjects. We adopt this approach because all theories of
statistical discrimination contend that discrimination is a reaction to imperfect
information. That is, more information should eliminate any evidence of discrim-
ination if discrimination is not taste-based. Our approach has some advantages.
First, by keeping the game constant we reduce the possibility of treatment effect
biases or lack of comparability between strategic games and allocation exercises.
Second, even in the absence of treatment effects, it is not clear if the presence or
absence of discrimination found in allocation exercises is the relevant information
on preferences in the strategic environment we study. For instance, people might
be indifferent to the race of those receiving their charity but not indifferent to the
composition of their neighborhood. A person might be willing to pay a premium
to live in a homogenous neighborhood and simultaneously give to charities that
target groups different than their own.
Our experiment is based on a series of repeated public good games with a
surprise group formation stage before playing the last rounds of the public goods
game. In the surprise group formation stage subjects are allowed to rank potential
partners using an incentive-based mechanism. It is in this stage where information
availability is manipulated. Subjects are shown the average past behavior of
potential partners, the photo of potential partners or both. Finally, since behavior
is highly correlated with appearance, we induce behavior to break this correlation
and test the effect of information when behavior is unusual. This treatment makes
information on appearance a poor predictor of behavior and therefore irrelavant
under the null hypothesis of statistical discrimination.
We find evidence consistent with statistical discrimination, but not taste-based
discrimination. First, we find that people of different backgrounds do behave
differently. In particular, black and indian subjects give significantly less than
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other subjects and, therefore, make less desirable partners. Second, we find that
subjects use information on appearance to rank potential partners. Black subjects
are ranked two ranks lower than other subjects when no information on past
behavior is provided. Even though Indians give statistically the same amount,
Indians are not ranked lower. Under closer inspection, we find that only white
subjects rank black subjects lower than others. On average, black subjects are
ranked four ranks lower than other subjects by white subjects. Finally, we find
that appearance is irrelevant for ranking people once information on average past
behavior is available. This is true even when behavior is induced.
The experiments also show that the ability to sort into groups can have sig-
nificant effects on the distribution of earnings. We find that sorting increases
contributions across all groups but more so for those groups composed of the
most preferred subjects. This amounts to an increase in average earnings but
also in the disparity of earnings. Finally, our experiments show that sorting into
groups is effective in increasing cooperation only when people know the identity
of their partners. Sorting based on past behavior only has no discernible effect on
either average payoffs or the distribution of payoffs.
2. Experimental Design
We use a linear public goods game to explore discrimination in group formation.
Each subject must decide how to divide a 25 token endowment between a private
investment and a public investment. Each token placed in the private investment
yields a return of 2 cents to the subject. Each token placed in the public investment
yields a return of αi to the subject and every other member of the group. In three
of the four treatments, αi = 1 cent. There are 20 subjects in each experimental
session. Subjects are randomly assigned to a five-person group and play 10 rounds
with that same group. At the end of each round, subjects learn their payoff, πs,
and the total number of tokens contributed to the public investment by the group,
G. In total, subjects play three 10-round sequences, and each 10-round sequence
is with the same group. At the end of the first 10-round sequence, subjects
are again randomly assigned to a new five-person group, and at the end of the
second 10-round sequence, subjects are asked to choose their group for the final
10 investment decisions. This is a surprise. Subjects do not know they will be
asked to choose their group before this point in the experiment. No personal
information is revealed in the first 20 rounds of the experiment.
In order to create an incentive for people to reveal who they would prefer to be
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matched with, we create the following game. Subjects rank all other subjects from
most preferred to least preferred. We provide subjects with some information on
the other subjects in the room to use for ranking. The information is either the
average amount contributed to the public investment during the second 10-round
sequence, the subject’s photo, or both. Subjects use that information to create
a list from most preferred to least preferred. Digital photographs of subjects are
taken at the beginning of the experiment, and photographs are head shots, similar
to a passport or identification photo.
Once all subjects submit their lists, groups are formed in four steps. First,
one person is chosen at random. A group is formed that includes the randomly
chosen person and her four best ranked partners. Second, one person from the
remaining 15 people who have not been assigned to a group is randomly chosen.
A group is formed with that person and her four best ranked partners from the
remaining people who have not been previously assigned to a group. Third, one
person from the remaining 10 people who have not been previously assigned to a
group is randomly chosen. The first four people on that persons list among the
remaining people are put in a group with that person. Fourth, anyone not already
assigned to a group is put in a group together. Subjects see a screen with the
information corresponding to the subjects in their new group and then play the
last 10 rounds with that group.
This mechanism is similar to the one suggested in Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002). The mechanism is incentive compatible if preferences over groups are ad-
ditive in the preferences over its members.1 It would also be incentive compatible,
regardless of preferences over groups, if people are able to rank all possible groups
that one could be paired with. Unfortunately, this option would be impractical
since the number of groups to be ranked would be exceedingly large.2
There are four experimental treatments: Contribution Only, Photo Only, Con-
tribution and Photo, and Two Types. Treatments differ in the αi assigned to each
person and the information that is shown to subjects when they are asked to rank
the other subjects.
In the Contribution Only, Photo Only and Contribution and Photo treatments,
1Additivity in this context means that if James prefers Jill’s company to Jane’s company,
then James always prefers a group than exchanges Jane by Jill, regardless of who the other
members of the group are. Under these conditions, revealing the ordering of others is a weakly
dominant strategy for James. If James is not chosen, he is indifferent in the ranking he reveals.
If he is chosen, he is better off by revealing his true rankings. Since preferences over others’
company is additive, it does not matter whether he is chosen first or last.
2In a session of 20 subjects, each subject would need to rank 3,876 possible groups.
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all subjects are assigned an αi = 1 cent. This means that the effective price of con-
tributing to the public good is p = 2 cents. In the Contribution Only treatment,
when subjects are asked to rank others, they see the average amount contributed
to the public good in the second 10-round sequence by all other subjects in the
room. In the Photo Only treatment, subjects see the photos of all other subjects.
And, in the Contribution and Photo treatment, subjects see the photo and the
average amount contributed to the public good in the second 10-round sequence.
The average is listed below each subject’s respective photo.
In the Two Types treatment, αi ∈ {0.25 cent, 2.5 cents}. Half of the subjects
are randomly assigned a value of 0.25 cent and half are randomly assigned a value
of 2.5 cents. Subjects keep the same value for all 30 rounds of play. A subject
with an αi = 2.5 cents has a price of giving of p = 0.8 cent and should invest her
entire endowment in the public good. A subject with an αi = 0.25 cent has a price
of giving of p = 8 cents, making investment in the public good very expensive.
We expect subjects assigned the low value to invest little to nothing in the public
good. We expect subjects with a high value to invest all of their endowment in
the public good. Since types are randomly assigned to subjects and each type has
a completely different predicted contribution level, there is no correlation between
personal characteristics and contribution levels. If subjects in this treatment are
ranked according to gender or race, then this must be taste-based discrimination.
The Contribution Only and Two Types treatments were run twice. The Photo
Only and Contribution and Photo treatments were run three times. Each exper-
imental session had 20 subjects. An experimental session lasted one hour and a
half. In total, 200 subjects participated in the four treatments. Subjects were
recruited from introductory courses in economics and political science.3 All ex-
periments were run in the computer lab at the Experimental Economics Center
(EXCEN) at Georgia State University.4
Fifty-four percent of the subjects are women. For race, 44.5% are self-classified
as African American or Black, 32.5% are Caucasian or White, 8.0% are Indian,
6.5% are Asian (not Indian), and 8.5% are combined as Other (this includes
Hispanics, Mulatos, one Arab, and one Pakistani). Average age is 21.0 years
(standard deviation 3.8 years). In the Contribution Only, Photo Only, and Con-
tribution and Photo treatments, average payoffs are $21.97 (standard deviation
3Almost all students take these courses at some point in their undergraduate career (either
as a required course or one that satisfies a general education requirement), so the course is filled
with a variety of majors.
4Georgia State University is a racially-diverse, urban campus in Atlanta.
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$2.63). In the Two Types treatment, average payoffs are $47.13 (standard devia-
tion $11.12).
3. Instrument Check
To test whether our experimental design yields results similar to previous research
on repeated linear public goods games, we look at the average contribution across
the three treatments where the price of giving is 2 (Contribution Only, Photo
Only, Contribution and Photo). Subjects played two 10-round sequences of the
public goods game with two different randomly assigned groups. In the first se-
quence (when subjects are inexperienced), the average contribution is 32.8% of the
endowment over all ten rounds. This is similar to that of Andreoni (1988), 33.2%,
and to Croson (1996), 35.7%, both of whom also use inexperienced subjects, main-
tain subjects in the same group, and have a price of giving of 2. Contributions also
show a steady downward trend over the 10 rounds. Average contributions start
out at 41.6% in the first round and decline to 23.9% in the tenth round. The last
rounds are slightly higher than 11.6% in Andreoni and 18.2% in Croson. Subjects
in our experiment knew they were playing three 10-round sequences, so the last
round in the first sequence was not the last round of the experiment. Subjects in
Andreoni and Croson’s experiments thought they would only play 10 rounds in
total.
The average contribution and trend behavior from our standard public goods
game is similar to previous work. We conclude that our instrument is good and
proceed to looking at behavior across treatments.
4. Results
We would like to know if people discriminate by gender or race when sorting into
groups and if that discrimination is statistical or taste-based. To do so, we need
to first look at behavior by gender and race and then at how people rank others.
Finally, we look at who are the winners and losers when people sort into groups.
4.1. Average Behavior
Table 1 shows the average percent contributed to the public good in sequence 2.
The second column shows the average using combined data from the Contribution
Only, Photo Only and Contribution and Photo treatments. Columns 3 and 4
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show results from the Two Types treatment. We look first at column 2. Men
contribute more than women, but this is not significantly different using a t-test
or a Wilcoxon rank sum test. Blacks and Indians contribute the least, on average,
with Indians contributing 19.5% and Blacks contributing 24.6%. These amounts
are statistically the same. All other groups contribute about 31%, and these are
also statistically the same. In terms of who gives more, Whites, Asians and Others
give significantly more than Blacks and Indians. The fact that Black and Indian
subjects give significantly less than other groups gives credence to theories of
statistical discrimination. Behavior is not independent of personal characteristics.
Table 1
Average Percent Contributed to the Public Good in Sequence 2
Combined Treatments
(Contribution Only, Photo Only, Two Types
and Contribution & Photo) Low Type High Type
Men 29.9 (5.3) 9.7 (1.1) 83.9 (2.1)
n=71 n=13 n=9
Women 24.7 (4.7) 15.1 (4.1) 74.1 (4.4)
n=89 n=7 n=11
Blacks 24.6 (4.8) 1.3 (0.76) 77.4 (2.3)
n=77 n=6 n=6
Whites 31.3 (5.6) 7.9 (2.2) 85.2 (3.7)
n=50 n=7 n=8
Indians 19.5 (3.5) 31.6 (1.4) -
n=15 n=1
Asians 31.6 (5.6) 22.4 (4.2) 42.8 (1.1)
n=10 n=2 n=1
Others 32.9 (4.0) 23.3 (3.3) 76.4 (4.5)
n=8 n=4 n=5
Total 27.1 (4.9) 11.6 (2.2) 78.5 (3.4)
n=160 n=20 n=20
Note: Average individual standard deviation in parentheses. Number of
observations are listed below.
In terms of contributions by gender and race, men give more than women across
all racial groups. For most groups, this is only a marginal difference, ranging from
3% more than women for black men to 26% more for white men. The largest
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differences are for Indians and Asians. In both groups, men give roughly twice
as much as women do. Asian men give 43.3% on average, and asian women
give 23.7%. Indian men give 22.6%, and indian women give 13.4%. While these
differences are substantial, none of the differences between men and women, for
any racial group, are significant using a Wilcox rank sum test or a t-test.5 While
the difference in contributions across gender is not significant, we do pick up some
variation in ranking in the ranking regressions by gender and race. We turn to
that in the next section.
Looking at the Two Types treatment in Table 1, average contribution for those
who were assigned a high type is 78.5%, and average contribution for low types is
11.6%. There is some variation across groups, but there are too few observations
per cell to draw any conclusions. High types do contribute significantly more
than low types across all racial groups, and it is this divergence that is key to
our ability to distinguish between statistical and taste-based discrimination. Note
that high types did not contribute 100% as the theory would predict. We discuss
this further in the next section.
Given average contributions in Photo Only, Contribution Only, and Contri-
bution and Photo, we would expect Blacks and Indians to be ranked lower since
they contribute the least. Men could be ranked higher since they contribute more
on average, but they have higher variability in behavior than women. They could
be seen as more risky.
4.2. Ranking
In the experiments, we allow people to rank who they would like to have in their
group for further rounds of investments so we can see if past behavior (percent
contributed to the public good), gender, and race affect ranking. The different
treatments allow us to tease apart differences in ranking due to past performance
and due to the gender and race of the person being ranked. Each person ranked
the other nineteen subjects in order from most preferred to least preferred as
fellow group members. We use OLS regressions to see how the rank received is
affected by the gender and race of the person being ranked as well as the past
performance.
In the regressions, it is not clear what is the most relevant measure of per-
5Either the difference in contributions is too small, the variability large, or we have a small
number of observations for certain groups. Recall that 77% of our sample is made up of Whites
and Blacks.
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formance for subjects making a decision on how to rank others. As mentioned
in section 2, treatments Contribution Only, Contribution and Photos and Two
Types revealed subjects average past contributions. However, contributions are
not strictly comparable across experimental sessions due to the fact that the dis-
tribution of average contributions varied across sessions for any treatment. An
average contribution of 10 tokens may be the highest average contribution in one
session but the median average contribution in another session. To make com-
parisons across sessions meaningful, we use the subject’s predicted rank for that
session’s distribution of contributions. So, if a subject had the highest average
contribution, her predicted rank would be the highest, no matter what the actual
value of that contribution is. Also, contributions are a cardinal variable while
people are asked an ordinal question. That is, using contributions straight might
insufficiently control for performance.6
Table 2 reports ranking results when controlling for predicted rank (pred rank),
gender, race, and gender/race interaction terms. The omitted race category is
White. A higher rank means that the person was more preferred to be in a
group. Regressions are run separately for each treatment. The Contribution Only
treatment allows us to see if past performance alone affects rank. The Photo
Only treatment shows if people discriminate based on race and gender, and the
Contribution and Photo and Two Types treatments show how rank is affected
when both performance and physical characteristics are known.
6The average contribution in the previous rounds could be a function of the particular group
the subject was in, be it a high or low performing group. With random assignment of groups,
however, everyone has an equal chance of being in a high or low performing group. So, while
contributions may well be correlated with the previous group, they are not correlated with an
individual’s gender or race. Also, if previous contributions give an unclear signal, we would
expect to see differential ranking by gender and race when previous performance is known, but
we do not.
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Table 2
Dependent Variable: Rank
Ordinary Least Squares
Contribution Photo Contribution &
Only Only Photo Two Types
constant 0.85 11.21 0.81 1.21
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
pred rank 0.92 0.90 0.87
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
male -0.53 0.16 0.20
(0.338) (0.497) (0.566)
black -2.14 0.17 0.33
(0.000) (0.440) (0.410)
asian 0.05 0.97 -0.90
(0.947) (0.112) (0.193)
indian 2.53 0.08 -0.33
(0.050) (0.852) (0.616)
other 1.89 0.49 0.14
(0.135) (0.408) (0.710)
black*male -0.14 -0.25 -0.42
(0.839) (0.451) (0.445)
asian*male 2.90 -1.02 0.82
(0.020) (0.223) (0.340)
indian*male - 0.08 -
- (0.877) -
other*male -2.57 -0.21 -0.45
(0.089) (0.780) (0.423)
N 760 1140 1140 760
adj-R2 0.83 0.06 0.80 0.75
Note: p-values in parentheses.
Looking at the results for the Contribution Only and Photo Only treatments,
we confirm that, in general, it is difficult to identify the separate effect of personal
characteristics on sorting. In Contribution Only, subjects only saw past average
contributions when ranking. Not surprisingly, ranking is strongly affected by the
subject’s predicted rank. The relationship is not quite one to one, but it is very
close. A one rank increase in predicted rank increases a person’s actual rank by
0.92.
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Considering the average contributions reported in Table 1, even when no per-
sonal characteristics were revealed to subjects in the Contribution Only treatment,
ex-post groups would likely be segregated by race or ethnicity. Indeed, this is the
case. Using the Contribution Only data and regressing rank on personal charac-
teristics of the person being ranked, Blacks and Indians are ranked lower. This is
the identification problem.
In Photo Only, subjects only saw pictures of the other subjects when rank-
ing. They did not know what any other subject contributed on average. In this
treatment, black subjects are ranked two ranks lower, indian subjects are ranked
two ranks higher, asian men are ranked almost three ranks higher, and other men
are ranked about two ranks lower. The results with these latter groups may well
be attributed to the small sample size.7 However, the result on Blacks is robust
to alternative specifications.8 Recall that both Blacks and Indians gave signifi-
cantly less on average and should be ranked lower if ranking is solely a function
of performance.
Not everyone agrees on the rankings in Photo Only. Table 3 shows regressions
of rank on personal characteristics for different groups of rankers in the Photo
Only treatment. Table 3 excludes other groups due to the scarcity of observations.
Conditioning on the gender and race of the person doing the ranking, we find that
only Whites are ranking Blacks lower. Blacks do not rank Blacks lower.9
This result is remarkable and shows that information is not equally important
(or used in the same way) for everyone. The regression in Table 2 hides this.
This evidence alone cannot distinguish the sources of discrimination. The results
are consistent with white subjects discriminating against black subjects, perhaps
statistically. But, it is also consistent with an in-group hypothesis that black
subjects favor other black subjects, since the payoff-maximizing strategy, given
the results shown in Table 1, is to rank black and indian subjects lower.
7There is only one Indian in the Photo Only treatment, and he is a male.
8Similar results hold if we run the regressions and interact race and gender with predicted
rank. If we classify people as Black or non-Black, the same results hold. Blacks are ranked at
least two ranks lower. The results are also robust to other specifications. A rank-ordered logit
yields similar results on the ranking of Blacks.
9If we combine all non-White and non-Black subjects into one group and see how they rank
in the Photo Only treatment, we find they do not rank Blacks lower.
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Table 3
Dependent Variable: Rank
Photo Only Treatment
Ordinary Least Squares
White White Black Black
Men Women Men Women
constant 13.53 12.00 10.18 10.34
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
male -4.42 0.75 -1.15 -0.05
(0.00) (0.50) (0.33) (0.97)
black -5.31 -4.32 -0.32 -1.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.74) (0.24)
asian -1.81 0.57 2.07 0.10
(0.37) (0.71) (0.23) (0.95)
indian 9.22 1.58 2.30 1.31
(0.00) (0.47) (0.47) (0.60)
other 5.47 -6.00 4.97 6.16
(0.27) (0.10) (0.03) (0.01)
black*male 4.28 -0.89 0.10 -0.51
(0.02) (0.55) (0.95) (0.70)
asian*male -1.10 -1.99 3.27 6.70
(0.73) (0.46) (0.20) (0.00)
indian*male - - - -
- - - -
other*male -4.25 5.50 -4.43 -7.28
(0.44) (0.18) (0.12) (0.01)
N 152 228 266 340
adj-R2 0.24 0.20 0.07 0.11
Note: p-values in parentheses.
Is the observed differential ranking by race and gender in Photo Only due to
taste-based discrimination? We cannot ascertain this from the regression results
alone. The results from Contribution Only clearly indicate that people want
higher contributors in their group. If asian men contribute more on average,
then we would expect them to be ranked higher in the Photo Only treatment. If
Blacks contribute less on average, then we would expect them to be ranked lower.
Because race and gender are correlated with contributions, we cannot determine
if the differential ranking in Photo Only is because people know who are the high
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and low contributors or because they do not like a particular group.
The treatments Contribution and Photo and Two Types permit us to see how
personal characteristics affect ranking when information on performance is also
provided. In the Two Types treatment, performance is uncorrelated with personal
characteristics by design.
Looking at the results in the Contribution and Photo and Two Types treat-
ments in Table 2, we see that when both photos and past performance are known,
the only significant predictor of how people are ranked is their past performance.
An increase by one of predicted rank increases actual rank by 0.90 in Contribu-
tion and Photo and by 0.87 in Two Types. The results from the Contribution and
Photo treatment suggest that the differential ranking by gender and race observed
in the Photo Only treatment is due to statistical discrimination. The Two Types
treatment confirms this.
In the Two Types treatment, past performance and race and gender are no
longer correlated. Each type was randomly assigned to subjects. If there is any
differential ranking in this treatment, it must be due to taste-based discrimination.
We see in Table 2 that this is not the case.10
4.3. Efficiency
The results thus far give evidence for statistical discrimination in how people rank
others. We would also like to know how sorting affects payoffs and efficiency. After
subjects submitted their rankings of others, four groups were formed. Group 1
is the first group formed, and Group 4 is the last group formed. Because the
group formation mechanism forms groups in order, Group 1 is more likely to be
composed of the most preferred people and Group 4 of the least preferred. Indeed,
the average rank of people in Group 1 is higher than that of people in Group 2,
and so on, for all treatments. Once groups are formed, subjects played another
ten rounds with the selected group.
Looking at payoffs first, Table 4 shows the average payoff in each group when
groups were randomly assigned and when they were chosen. The first panel shows
payoffs in each treatment in sequence 2, when groups were randomly assigned.
The last row in the panel shows the difference between the highest and lowest
10This is further confirmed by looking at the extremes of behavior. Recall that not all high
types gave 100% of their endowment, and not all low types were free riders. So, there was some
variation in behavior by high types and by low types. Looking at individuals whose average
contribution was 25 tokens or 0 tokens, we still find no evidence of differential ranking by gender
or race.
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average payoff for the treatment. This difference is between $1.52-$1.65 in the
first three treatments and $8.56 in the Two Types treatment. Comparing this to
the second panel, which shows payoffs in sequence 3 when groups were chosen,
there is a much larger difference when groups are chosen. The difference in highest
and lowest payoffs ranges between $2.18-$3.70 for the first three treatments and
is $26.23 in the Two Types treatment.
Table 4
Average Payoff per Person for Entire Sequence by Group
Random Groups (Sequence 2)
Contribution Photo Contribution &
Only Only Photo Two Types
Group 1 7.75 7.11 6.33 10.88
Group 2 6.45 6.35 6.82 16.64
Group 3 7.77 7.94 7.98 13.83
Group 4 6.24 6.49 7.14 19.44
Highest - Lowest 1.52 1.59 1.65 8.56
Chosen Groups (Sequence 3)
Contribution Photo Contribution &
Only Only Photo Two Types
Group 1 7.66 9.54 9.65 31.14
Group 2 7.73 6.57 8.26 23.20
Group 3 5.94 8.03 7.08 7.82
Group 4 5.55 7.00 5.95 4.92
Highest - Lowest 2.18 2.97 3.70 26.23
These differences show that there is increasing income inequality when peo-
ple are allowed to sort into groups. The difference between the lowest average
individual payoff in a group and the highest increases by 33%-300% when people
are allowed to choose groups. This is significant in all treatments but Contri-
bution Only.11 The increase in inequality is due to changes on both ends of the
distribution. The lowest payoff declines and the highest increases, except in the
Contribution Only treatment.
11An interquantile regression between the 10th and 90th percentle shows a significantly larger
payoff when playing with a chosen group in all treatments but Contribution Only.
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Table 5
Average Money Generated in a Session by Sequence and Treatment
Contribution Photo Contribution &
Only Only Photo Two Types Total
Random Groups (Seq 2) 141.07 139.47 141.36 303.94 725.83
Chosen Groups (Seq 3) 134.34 155.66 154.73 335.43 780.15
Percentage change -5% 12% 9% 10% 7%
Does this increase in income inequality from sorting also imply a loss of effi-
ciency? Not necessarily. Table 5 shows the average amount of money generated
in an experimental session when groups are randomly assigned and when groups
are chosen. Overall, allowing people to sort into groups generates more money
across the treatment sessions. The overall amount generated increases by 7%.
The biggest gains come in sessions where subjects can see the photograph of their
fellow group members. In these sessions, the money generated increases by 9-12%.
There is a net decrease in Contribution Only. Thus, while sorting does increase
income inequality across subjects in different groups, it does not necessarily de-
crease efficiency in the session.
We have seen an important difference in how people are ranked by others
based on race. Does this differential ranking also imply that people make differ-
ent amounts of money in the last ten rounds? Looking at the difference between
payoffs for Whites and Blacks, Blacks do make significantly less money in the
Contribution Only and Photo Only treatments, but there is no significant differ-
ence in payoffs in the Contribution & Photo and Two Types treatments.12 While
Blacks make less money in the first two treatments, they are also more likely to
be in Group 4 in those treatments. Everyone in Group 4 makes less money than
those in Group 1.
Conditioning on being in the top group, however, the percentage gain in income
from being in a randomly assigned group to being in a chosen group does not differ
between Blacks and Whites. The gain in income is 0-5% in Contribution Only,
55-58% in Photo Only, 24-36% in Contribution and Photo, and 102-104% in Two
Types. That is, once someone makes it to the most preferred group, payoffs are
12The p-value for the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference in payoffs in Contribution Only
is 0.0266, in Photo Only is 0.0670, in Contribution and Photo is 0.3530, and in Two Types is
0.7505.
16
similar. This means that the difference in payoff from sorting is not necessarily
due to personal characteristics but to the group one belongs to.
Where do these efficiency gains come from? Table 6 shows the percentage
change in contributions from sequence 2 to sequence 3. In the treatments where
photos are shown, there is an increasing differentiation in behavior. Members of
Group 1 change their behavior the most, whereas Group 4 changes their behavior
the least. There is a significant increase in contribution behavior in Group 1
in Photo Only and Contribution and Photo.13 There no significant change in
behavior in the Two Types treatment, but in the top group, there was little room
for change since most were already contributing close to their full endowment.
This shows that it is not sorting per se that changes behavior but seeing who is
in one’s group.14
Table 6
Change in Individual Budget Share Contributions
from Sequence 2 to Sequence 3
Contribution Photo Contribution &
Only Only Photo Two Types
Group 1 -5% 28% 18% 7%
Group 2 0% -4% 10% 15%
Group 3 -10% 14% 6% 2%
Group 4 -3% 5% 1% 3%
4.4. Social Distance and Contribution Behavior
Contribution behavior in the chosen group may also be affected by whether a
person was in a group with preferred partners. It might be the case that an
individual is more cooperative in a group with people she wanted to be with. We
find some evidence to support this hypothesis only in the Contribution and Photo
treatment. In all treatments, conditioning on a person’s own average rank, the
average rank of all group members, and the average contribution in the previous
13A regression on the average change in contributions from being in a randomly-assigned
group to a chosen group is regressed on dummy variables for each group for the last 10-round
sequence.
14Andreoni and Petrie (2004) found a similar result in that individual contributions to the
public good increased significantly only when group members could identify other group mem-
bers.
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ten rounds, we find that past behavior significantly explains average contributions
in the final ten rounds in all treatments.
In the Contribution and Photo treatment, however, people do also contribute
more if they are in a more-preferred group. As the average ranking of all group
members increases by one, average contributions increase by 1.14 tokens. This
means that people increase their cooperation in groups they want to be in and
decrease their contributions when they are with people they do not want to be
with.
5. Conclusion
We present a new experimental design that permits us to analyze the nature and
consequence of discrimination in group formation and cooperation. Our design
allows us to distinguish between statistical and taste-based discrimination within
the same game by manipulating the information made available to subjects and
by breaking the correlation between performance and personal characteristics.
Subjects play a repeated linear public goods game and are allowed to rank others
as potential group members for the last ten rounds of play. We sytematically vary
the information available for ranking. Either subjects see the past performance
of others, the photo, or both. A final treatment randomly assigns either a low or
high price of giving so that contribution behavior is not correlated with a person’s
gender or race. Any differential ranking of others by gender or race must be due
to taste-based discrimination.
We find that there is differential ranking of others by personal characteristics,
but this discrimination is mainly statistical and clear incentives/signals eliminate
it. Because payoffs in public goods games are increasing in the contributions
of others, a payoff-maximizing individual would do best by choosing cooperative
people to be in her group. This is precisely what we find. Past performance is a
consistently strong predictor of how someone is ranked by others.
Absent information on past performance, though, do subjects use personal
characteristics to rank others? We find that they do. The most consistent result
is that black subjects are ranked lower than others when past performance is
unknown. We find some evidence consistent with in-group/out-group behavior in
this ranking, as only white subjects rank Blacks lower.
This differential ranking cannot be attributed to taste-based discrimination.
Both black and indian subjects contribute less than any other group, although
Indians are not ranked lower. Because contribution behavior and personal char-
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acteristics are correlated, from this result alone we cannot determine if this is due
to statistical or taste-based discrimination.
Once we control for performance and personal characteristics, the only expla-
nation for how one is ranked is past performance. This result is strongly con-
firmed with our last treatment that breaks the correlation between performance
and characteristics. This implies that observed discrimination in the absence of
information on performance is statistical. Also, given clear signals of performance,
any discrimination is eliminated.
There are efficiency gains to sorting but at the expense of income equality. By
allowing people to choose their groups, there is a 7% increase in money generated
in the experiment. The largest gains happen in the treatments where people can
identify their fellow group members. At the same time that efficiency increases
with sorting, there is increasing income inequality between the most-preferred
and least-preferred groups. That is, while the experimental economy as a whole
benefits by allowing people to sort into groups, there are clear winners and losers.
We find no evidence that personal characteristics affect payoffs for those in
the most-preferred group. Blacks do earn less than Whites when there is sorting,
but that difference disappears when subjects know past performance and see the
person’s picture. Indeed, the gains in earnings for being in the top group are no
different between Blacks and Whites.
Our results suggest that people do hold perceptions about others based on
their personal characteristics. And, it appears that people use them as a basis
to sort into groups. Information on personal characteristics, however, is used
differently by different groups. Blacks disregard personal information, even when
they should not, and Whites seem to use this information more.
It remains to be learned why black and indian subjects consistently contribute
less. It may be an expression of difference in expectations across subjects and
suggests that heterogeneity in behavior and beliefs is important in our sample.
Mechanisms that give clear signals on performance, though, eliminate any
evidence of differentiation. This is good news for policy makers who may be
seeking institutions that diminish discrimination. The challenge is how to design
them in ways that are believable and efficient.
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